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      News & EventsNewsroom Press Releases • December 3, 2002
ABS Press Releases
Prestige Casualty - Information Update No.5
Preliminary Comments Regarding Initiating Damage to Prestige

December 3, 2002
Preliminary Comments Regarding Initiating Damage to Prestige

1. Vessel particulars
2. Departure loading condition
3. Damaged condition
4. Possible initiating causes
5. Discussion of structure failure hypothesis
6. Counter ballasted condition


ABS is currently developing a detailed technical assessment and report which should be released early February 2003. These preliminary comments are presented as background information only and are based substantially upon information made public by other sources.

1. Vessel particulars

 


Length (LOA) 243.5 m
Breadth 34.4 m
Depth 18.7 m
Draft 14.0 m
Gross Tonnage 42,820
Deadweight Tonnage 81,589
Built 1976 at Hitachi Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. Japan
IMO Number 7372141
   
General arrangement

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2. Departure loading condition (5 Nov 2002)

  • Still water bending moment is 43% of allowable
  • Vessel stability in compliance with approved loading manual
  • CBT mode (Clean Ballast Tanks)

Cargo distribution




Cargo
76973 m tons
Type
Heavy Fuel Oil
(M-100)

 

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3. Damaged condition (13 Nov 2002)
(to 15 minutes post incident)


  • Vessel reportedly in severe weather, taking beam seas on starboard side, with reportedly extensive damage to gangway and manifold drip pans.
  • As reported by master and crew, there was an "explosive" sound and shudder at 15.10 hours.
  • Apparently this was one event and not sequential.

Consequences:

  • List happened quickly with master reporting the vessel "started to list in 5 minutes".
    This was due from the assumed flooding starboard #2 aft and #3 wing tanks.

  • Master reported a 24 degree list within 15 minutes.
    (Note: Damage stability calculations show that with cargo tanks intact and flooding starboard #2 aft and #3 wing tanks results in 26 degree list to starboard.)

  • Still water bending moment 125% of allowable.

  • Listed vessel rolling in waves up to 8 meters, as reported by the master.

  • Master reports #4 starboard wing and #2 center spilling oil from butterworth openings.
    (Note: These are small openings with removeable covers.)

  • All cargo tanks apparently still structurally intact, as no cargo leakage reported other than through the butterworth openings.



Cross section in way of #2 and #3 aft wing tanks

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4. Possible initiating causes
a.

Potential external initiators - News reports stated that at least three (3) vessels lost part of their cargo. One vessel was carrying containers, another wooden logs and a third 1.10 m pipes.

  • impact with floating logs
  • impact with floating container
  • breaking wave impact
  • other
b.

Potential internal initiators

  • explosion - unlikely because no evidence of explosive deformation in surrounding structure
  • structural failure in way of Frame 71 to cause flooding of starboard #2 aft and #3 wing (see discussion in item 5)
c. Potential operational initiators - The ramifications of the vessel being in bunkering service for two (2) years, from October 2000 to the start of this voyage, with a large fender positioned at Frame 71 starboard require further evaluation.

d. Potential repair initiators - The ramifications of extensive structural repair in way of Frame 71 starboard in May 2001 require further evaluation.

 

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5. Discussion of structure failure hypothesis

Investigation and analysis are underway but no apparent structural cause has yet been determined.
Findings from the initial assessment are:

a. Sudden loss of shell plating at Frame 71 appears unlikely because internal stiffening system of transverse bulkhead and side longitudinals support the shell plating.
b. Collapse of a transverse bulkhead between starboard #2 aft and #3 wing tanks appears unlikely because upper two-thirds of bulkhead was replaced in 2001.
c. Collapse of a transverse web frame appears unlikely because upper portions of most transverse web frames in starboard #2 aft and #3 wing tanks were replaced and repaired in 2001.
d. Failure of a transverse web frame strut appears unlikely because struts were in compression at the time, and a strut failure in the compressive mode would not normally cause sudden loss of shell plating.

Structure in sagging condition

Finite Element Structural Analysis Model showing centerline
cut out section of # 3 center and starboard wing tanks.

 

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6. Counter ballasted condition (13 Nov 2002)

  • To right the vessel and eliminate pollution through the deck openings the master ordered the counterflooding of # 2 aft port and # 3 port ballast tanks.

  • No oil release reported.

  • Analysis indicates that the counter ballasted condition further over stressed the hull girder (still water bending moment 154% of maximum allowable).

  • In the flooded, overloaded condition and subject to wave loading in the open sea, the structurally damaged vessel was susceptible to subsequent failure of structural components and oil loss from cargo tanks.

 

 


The information provided in this preliminary assessment is based on published sources. ABS has not verified in any way the information obtained from third parties. The preliminary assessment is provided WITH ALL FAULTS on an AS IS, AS AVAILABLE basis and ABS expressly disclaims all warranties including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. ABS, its affiliates, and its and their officers, directors, employees, subcontractors and agents, shall not be liable for any loss, injury, claim, liability, or damage of any kind resulting in any way from the preliminary assessment or use thereof.

 

For more information, contact:
Stewart Wade (swade@eagle.org)
1-281-877-5850

 


 



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