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      News & EventsNewsroom Press Releases • November 20, 2002
ABS Press Releases

Prestige Casualty - Information Update No. 3
Prestige Fact Sheet


November 20, 2002

General Information, M/T Prestige

IMO Number: 7372141
Built: 1976 at Hitachi Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. Japan
Owner: Mare Shipping Inc., Registered in Liberia
Manager: Universe Maritime Ltd., Greece
Class: ABS - Built and maintained to ABS class
Flag: Bahamas
Marpol 13G Phase out Date: 11 March 2005
Design Deadweight: 81,589 tonnes
Gross Tonnage: 42,820
Sister Vessels: None in service
Statutory Certification: ABS on behalf of Bahamas with exception of ISM certification, issued by Bureau Veritas.
P&I Coverage: London Steamship Owners Association
Pollution Liability Coverage: The operators state that Mare Shipping is fully covered for shipowner's pollution liability within the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund.
Notes: The vessel was constructed of mild steel.

The vessel was subject to the IACS Enhanced Survey Program (ESP)

The vessel was a Category 1 vessel under MARPOL 13G requirements, approved for either Hydrostatic Balanced Loading (HBL), as a crude oil tanker, or CBT with 30 percent side or bottom protection, as a product tanker. Information provided by the operator shows the vessel was loaded in conformance with the CBT requirements at the time of the casualty.

Also Note: Under the US Oil Pollution Act of 1990, single hull tankers without either double sides or double bottoms of 30,000 gross tons and larger are not permitted to trade in US ports after 1 January 2000. However, the Prestige would have been permitted to carry cargo to the US until 1 January 2015 provided it was offloaded either at a licensed deepwater port (LOOP), or at any one of four established offshore lightering zones. These are located more than 60 miles offshore (Southtex, Gulfmex No 2, Offshore Pascagoula No 2 and South Sabine Point).

General Information, World Tanker Fleet
(Source Clarksons)

World Tanker Fleet (including chemical carriers) 8/2002

< 10,000 dwt 2,404
> 10,000 dwt 4,916
Total 7,320

World Single Hull Tanker Fleet (including chemical carriers) 8/2002
< 10,000 dwt 1,829
> 10,000 dwt 3,414
Total 5,243

World Double Hull Tanker Fleet (including chemical carriers) 8/2002
< 10,000 dwt 575
> 10,000 dwt 1,502
Total 2,077

ABS Classed Tanker Fleet (Total) 920
ABS Classed Single Hull Tanker Fleet 601
ABS Classed Double Hull Tanker Fleet 319

Class Survey History

Special Survey No. 5: Conducted in Guangzhou China, May 2001.
Class:
Drydocking Survey, Tailshaft Survey, Annual and Special Periodic Survey of Hull, Automation & Inert Gas System, Annual Survey of Machinery, Special Continuous Survey Machinery, Boiler Surveys, Damage/Repair Survey, Gauging Survey and Review;
Statutory:
Annual Load Line Inspection, Load Line Renewal, Safety Radio (SLR), Safety Equipment (SLE), Safety Construction (SLC) and International Oil Pollution (IOPP) Renewal Surveys, Survey for Compliance with Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Reg II-1/3.3 and II-2/59 and Cargo Gear Re-Testing Surveys.

Two ABS surveyors with appropriate qualifications attended. The gauging firm used was Dimitros Thomas Marine Limited, whose certification was issued 12 October 1998 with a validity of three years.

The vessel was first visited on 2nd April, 2001. The overall inspection, close-up survey, thickness measurements were carried out together with the hydrostatic testing of the tank boundaries as required by the rule requirements afloat at anchorage in Guangzhou, PRC between 2nd and 10th April 2001. Thickness measurements were taken in accordance with the rule requirements during the close-up survey and witnessed by the surveyors. The certificate for the gauging technician and the calibration records were reviewed and found in order, the equipment was also verified to be in order before the thickness measurements commenced.

Upon completion of the above examinations, the vessel moved to Guangzhou Cosco Shipyard for repairs on 10th April 2001. Before commencement of the repair, the material for repair was verified against mill certificate, the material was also selected for confirmatory testing and all shown in order. The welding procedures and the welders' qualification records, the NDT (Non Destructive Testing) equipment records and the operators' qualifications were verified. The welding sequence, gouging process were also discussed with the shipyards quality control department and the ship owner representative.

The major repairs were undertaken in the side ballast/cargo tanks No.3 (P&S) and concentrated mostly on the transverse bulkheads and the frames at the upper levels within the tank. Accordingly, the above-mentioned tanks were fully staged at Frames 61 & 71 and between Frs.65 - 70 respectively. Staging was also extended to various areas for the repair of shell and longitudinal bulkhead longitudinals.

In particular, in way of the side ballast/cargo tank Nos.2(aft) & 3, the shell plates were close-up surveyed internally and externally examined. There was no area of concern noted on the shell plate. Thickness measurement results showed that the average wastage on the shell plate was less than 10 percent. No repair was considered necessary on the shell plate at the time. The starboard shell longitudinals were found below 10 percent wastage in side ballast/cargo tank No.2(S) aft and the starboard shell longitudinals were found mostly between 10-15 percent wastage in side ballast/cargo tank No.3(S) at time of survey.

The repair works onboard were divided into three stages : fit-up, gouging and final examination. They were carried out under supervision of the attending surveyors and found satisfactory.

Upon completion of the repair, confirmatory non-destructive testing by radiographic & ultrasonic method was selectively carried out, confirmatory hydro-test and air-tests were also carried out and all found satisfactory. The repair / testing was completed on 19 May 2001.

Total steel replaced is estimated at 362 tonnes. The repairs that were required were in accordance with those that could reasonably be expected on a vessel of this type at Fifth Special Survey.

Annual Survey: Conducted in Dubai, UAE.
The vessel's last Annual Class Survey and Statutory Surveys were carried out by the Dubai office of ABS while the vessel was in the Fujairah anchorage, UAE, in May 2002. The survey was commenced on May 15. All repairs were completed to surveyor's satisfaction and the appropriate certificates were issued on 25 May 2002.
Class Surveys: Annual surveys of Hull, Machinery, Automation and Inert Gas System. Damage/Repair Survey.
Statutory Surveys: Annual Load Line Inspection; SLR - Periodical; SLE - Annual; SLC - Annual; IOPP Annual; Annual Cargo Gear.

Port State Control Inspections:
Interrogation of the Equasis database indicates the following PSC inspections were undertaken:

1 Sept 1999, Rotterdam No detentions; 2 Life saving related deficiencies, 1 General deficiency
25 June 1999, Baltimore No detentions, no deficiencies
19 May 1999, Long Island (US) No detentions, no deficiencies
19 April 1999, New York No detentions, one navigational related deficiency
15 April 1999, Long Island (US) No detentions, no deficiencies
28 Nov 1998, Port Hawksbury No detentions, no deficiencies

Lloyd's Seasearcher database reports one previous casualty, in 1991, involving a fouled propeller.


The Cargo

The operators of the vessel state it was carrying a cargo of 76,972 metric tonnes of heavy fuel oil (cst 600, Specific Gravity 0.99), typically used as bunker fuel.

The cargo was distributed as per the loading plan (Diagram 1) by which the No 2 aft (P&S) and No 3 (P&S) wing tanks were left empty.

According to the loading configuration provided to ABS by the owner, the vessel appeared to have been loaded properly, in conformance with the loading manual and with a maximum bending moment of 43 percent of the maximum allowable still water bending moment on departure Latvia.


The Casualty

At around 1510 LT on Wednesday 13th November, the vessel developed a reported 24 degree starboard list while on passage in heavy seas and high winds (said to be storm force 8) in the region of Cape Finisterre, between 25-30 nautical miles off the coast of Galicia in northwest Spain.

The Bahamas Maritime Authority reports the vessel experienced a sudden vibration prior to listing.

A stability analysis of the vessel indicated that both No2 starboard aft and No3 starboard wing tanks would have had to be flooded to create such a condition.

A preliminary strength analysis of the hull girder with these two compartments flooded and the hull in an intact condition indicated that the maximum still water bending moment had increased to 125 percent or 25 percent in excess of the maximum allowable value in calm seas.

The analysis indicated that the vessel retained a positive righting arm granting sufficient stability for the conditions.

In this condition the vessel's hull structure should have been able to, and in fact appeared able to cope with the increased loading.

24 of the 27-man crew (Filipino and Romanian) were reported airlifted off the vessel. The Master, Chief Officer and Chief Engineer were reported to have remained on board.

Crew members, interviewed by the media on reaching shore, claimed the vessel had struck a submerged object occasioning a severe shudder of the hull structure.

To date, no conclusive evidence of the initiating cause of the damage that led to the apparent flooding of the empty Number 2 Aft starboard and No 3 starboard wing tanks has been identified.

The Spanish government refused to offer the vessel or the salvors a sheltered location for the vessel and ordered it to be held more than 60 nautical miles off the coast.


Subsequent Action

The Bahamas Maritime Authority states that the Master ordered the righting of the vessel by intentionally flooding the No 2 port aft wing tank and the No 3 port wing tank, both of which were empty and intact.

This action reportedly brought the vessel back to an estimated 3-5 degree starboard list.

An analysis of the hull girder strength in this condition, again based on data provided by the operator, indicates that the maximum still water bending moment increased to 154 percent, or 54 percent in excess of the allowable level in calm seas, assuming the vessel's structure had remained intact.

Any damage to the structure would imply a further increase in the bending stress.

In this condition the vessel's hull structure was subject to severe overloading. Unless the vessel could be quickly brought into calm waters, the additional dynamic wave loads to which the hull structure would be subject in open waters would lead to a progressive deterioration in the hull structure until ultimate failure as subsequently occurred.

Given the excessive loads to which the vessel was subjected, its ability to remain afloat until 19 November, six days after sustaining the initial damage, is remarkable.


Cause of the Casualty

The initiating cause of the casualty is as yet unknown.

The flag state, Bahamas, has launched a thorough investigation to determine, if possible, the fundamental cause of the casualty. ABS has made all class records and requested technical information available to the Bahamas Maritime Authority and has offered any and all technical assistance needed as part of this investigation.

ABS is also conducting further detailed dynamic wave load analysis of the stresses to which the hull structure would have been subject in the damaged condition, and is simulating the reported flooding sequence as part of its investigation.

Further updates will be posted as information becomes available.

 


For more information, contact:
Stewart Wade (swade@eagle.org)
1-281-877-5850

 


 



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