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Design
and Operational Matters
Integrated
Tug-Barge Standards
Guidelines
containing safety requirements for integrated tug-barges (ITB's)
were approved as MSC/Circ.866. Applicable to all ITB's, the guidelines
categorize ITB's based on the extent of "fixity" of the connecting
arrangement. ITB's with completely rigid connections are treated
as if it were a manned engine driven single ship with size and dimensions
based on the combined arrangement. ITB's with a connection that
(1) provides for relative motion and (2) can be disconnected in
harbor conditions by one person within five minutes can be treated
as two individual ships. In this case, the tug should also be capable
of towing the barge on a hawser. 21.7
Fuel Oil System
Recognizing the continued occurrence of machinery space fires arising
from leakage of fuel oil due primarily to worn, incorrectly fitted/tightened
or unsuitable components, MSC approved a new MSC/Circ.851 on the
maintenance and operation of fuel oil systems in reducing system
failures. The Guidelines focus on the high pressure pulses and consequential
vibrations on the components which can cause excessive fatigue stresses
and failure in some engine components. The Guidelines acknowledge
the trend of engine manufacturers towards limiting the fuel rail
outlet pressures to not exceed 16 bar. 6.16
Engine
Room Arrangements
Guidelines for engine room layout, design and arrangement were approved
as MSC/Circ.834. Focusing on man-machine interface, the Guidelines
address five relevant factors and reference acceptable standards:
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Familiarity - errors in identifying or reading instruments can
be minimized by color coding of piping, tagging cables, providing
valve status indication;
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Occupational Health - minimize noise levels and exposure to oil
vapor/mist and provide for adequate levels of lighting, ventilation
and air conditioning.
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Ergonomics - cater to human senses, limitations and work patterns,
relative to equipment location, maintenance, display and system
complexity.
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Risk Minimization - physically locate equipment to minimize the
risk of multiple failures from the consequences of a single failure;
and
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Survivability - placement of emergency equipment and escape routes
considering typical duty stations and access routes to facilitate
the greatest chance of survival. 6.3
Training
of MOU Personnel
A draft Assembly resolution containing recommendations on training
of personnel on mobile offshore units, MOU's, was approved by the
MSC and will be sent to the 21st Assembly for adoption in 1999.
MOU's are considered to be vessels which can be readily relocated
to perform industrial functions including offshore construction,
maintenance, lifting, pipe laying, diving and other support related
activities. The recommendations provide minimum basic knowledge
requirements -- and the methods for demonstrating and evaluating
competence -- for personnel survival, fire fighting/prevention,
first aid, personal safety and social responsibilities. Additionally,
specialized training and qualifications for key personnel (installation
manager, barge supervisor, ballast control operator and maintenance
supervisor) are provided for their respective areas of responsibility.
7.6
Assessment of Seafarer Competence
Guidance for qualified individuals onboard the ship identified as
being responsible for assessing, onboard, the seafarers' competence
and proficiency which is intended to be used for certification under
the STCW Convention were approved as MSC/Circ.853. The process of
onboard assessment is to be accomplished through a system of quality
standards which considers in-service experience and is subject to
verification of validity, reliability and consistency of assessment
results. Upon identifying overall and shipboard performance objectives
an assessment program is prepared to determine performance measures
and standards. Based on the observations found during the assessment,
the qualified individual prepares a performance improvement plan.
7.13
Solo Watchkeeping
Significant discussion focused on the STCW Convention pertaining
to the continued operation of ships with the officer of the navigational
watch acting as the sole look-out in periods of darkness. In June
1996 the 66th Session of the MSC, by a majority, recommended that
Administrations should discontinue trials of sole look-outs in periods
of darkness after 31 December 1997, and that the results of such
trials be should submitted to IMO for consideration.
Consistent with the views expressed in June 1996, a majority of
the Delegations again supported the position of the U.S. in that
a properly trained look-out is an asset to the navigational watch
officer in establishing a higher state of vigilance to ensure safe
and environmentally responsible operation by the bridge management
team. There also existed the concern that, if solo watchkeeping
were extended to a 24 hour period and this became common practice,
adequate safe guards would not be maintained.
A number of Delegations presented contrary arguments based on trial
results of 725 ship-years operation together with independent human
factors research and risk assessment.
Information and studies presented by Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Vanuatu,
and the Netherlands showed that solo watchkeeping in periods of
darkness with integrated, technologically advanced and ergonomically
arranged bridge arrangements, provided for enhanced safety relative
to conventional bridge/watchkeeping arrangements with reduced levels
of risk. These Administrations discontinued the trial periods after
31 December 1997. However, as allowed for by the STCW Convention,
the trial ships were permitted to operate with solo watchkeeping
and with specific officer qualifications and bridge equipment and
arrangement requirements, until such time that the MSC determines
that amendment to the STCW Convention is deemed necessary.
Although
the MSC approved MSC/Circ.867 which calls upon Administrations to
discontinue all solo watchkeeping in periods of darkness, the above
Administrations reserved their position based on their view that
a technical evaluation of the trials had not been performed as foreseen
by the STCW Convention. 21.27
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